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PROTECTING THE PLAYGROUND: OPTIONS 
FOR CONFRONTING THE IRANIAN REGIME 
Bryan P. Schwartz* & Christopher C. Donaldson** 
INTRODUCTION 
he situation facing the United States in its relations with the Ira-
nian regime is reminiscent of schoolyard politics.1 Imagine you 
are the biggest and toughest kid on the playground. All the other kids 
respect you out of fear of your size and strength. Now imagine you learn 
that your best friend is cornered by a bully across the yard near the 
swings. The bully has threatened your friend with violence, and rumor 
has it that the bully has been trying—perhaps successfully—to acquire or 
construct powerful weapons to make good on that threat. There is a 
chance the bully may wipe your best friend and many others clear off the 
face of the playground. What do you do? 
After years of hurling threats and physical abuse by proxy at Israel, 
Iran is now coming closer than ever to obtaining nuclear weapons.2 Some 
commentators believe the Iranians would use these weapons to get what 
they want, via threat or actual attack.3 Time is running out for the United 
States (and the rest of the kids on the playground) to take action to pre-
vent a catastrophe.4 
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 1. See discussion infra Part I. 
 2. THÉRÈSE DELPECH, IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ABDICATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 10 (Ros Schwartz trans., Columbia University Press 2007) (2006). 
 3. See Middle East Media Res. Inst., Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on Using a 
Nuclear Bomb Against Israel, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/582.htm. 
 4. For the comments of Israel’s President Shimon Peres, see generally Mark Lavie, 




396 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:2 
An international body like the United Nations—or, an individual coun-
try like the United States—can choose to intervene5 diplomatically, eco-
nomically, or militaristically,6 and can then choose from at least two dif-
ferent angles (positive or negative) from which to pursue any one of 
these approaches. All in all, there are at least six distinct courses of ac-
tion worth considering. 
In Part I of this Article, for background, we briefly explore the origins 
of the current global tensions Iran is fueling. In Part II, we discuss the 
various options available to the U.S. and its allies in dealing with Iran. 
Finally, in Part III, we offer suggestions as to which route is best given 
the current environment, and we argue that the lessons of World War II 
might beneficially inform the approach to Iran. 
Ultimately, in laying out the available options, our primary hope is that 
the confrontation can be resolved effectively and without cost to human 
life. Also, we hope the forthcoming analysis may shed some light on 
similar problems in the future. 
I. THE ISSUES 
The current Iranian regime is problematic for two main reasons. First, 
they have actively supported terrorism both in the Middle East and in 
other areas of the world.7 Second, they have continued to press on with 
their nuclear program despite the United Nations’ resolutions expressing 
international consensus that they must end it. 8 The current regime has 
taken the role of a bully, using force (violent and otherwise) to get what 
it wants regardless of the consequences for the rest of the world.9 It is 
this egocentrism and lack of concern for larger global society that wor-
ries observers and has led to the calls for action.10 
A. Terrorism 
The current Iranian regime has a history of providing financial and 
ideological support to violent organizations. In Lebanon, the regime has 
funded Hezbollah since its inception.11 In Gaza, the regime provides 
                                                                                                             
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II. 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 8. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.A–B. 
 10. For an example of a call to action, see S.C. Res.1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 
(Sept. 27, 2008). 
 11. See Andrea Levin, Death and Destruction are Hezbollah’s Goals,THE BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 8, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2006/08/ 
08/death_and_destruction_are_hezbollahs_goals/. 
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support to both Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (“PIJ”).12 In sup-
porting these groups, the Iranian regime has had a direct or indirect hand 
in the deaths of thousands around the world. 
In the early 1980s, Hezbollah was created by the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard—the regime’s militant wing under the control of the Iranian Su-
preme Leader.13 Iran reportedly injects $120 million into Hezbollah an-
nually14 and allegedly also provides periodic shipments of missiles.15 The 
fact that Iran has supported a group whose avowed goal is to destroy 
Israel16 has raised eyebrows around the world.17 Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s 
violence has reached other nations beyond Israel as well.18 
In 1983, as one of its first organized acts, Hezbollah orchestrated a 
truck bomb attack at the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut that killed 241 
people.19 Until September 11, 2001, Hezbollah had killed more Ameri-
cans than any other terrorist group.20 In 1994, with Iranian funding, Hez-
bollah bombed the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association building in Bu-
enos Aires, Argentina, killing 85 and wounding 300 others.21 With Iran’s 
help, Hezbollah has spread its particular brand of violence to several cor-
ners of the globe. 
But Hezbollah is not the only terrorist group that benefits from Iranian 
patronage. Hamas, before it became the ruling party of the Palestinian 
Authority, was receiving funding from Iran as well.22 And this funding 
increased when Hamas gained power.23 Iran also supplies rockets24 to 
                                                                                                             
 12. Dore Gold, Introduction, in JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, IRAN, 
HIZBULLAH, HAMAS AND THE GLOBAL JIHAD 7, 7 (2007). 
 13. Don Mills, Hezbollah’s Hate, Made in Iran, NAT’L POST, July 28, 2006, at A12. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Amos Harel & Yoav Stern, Iranian Official Admits Tehran Supplied Missiles to 
Hezbollah, HAARETZ, Aug. 5, 2006, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ 
ShArt.jhtml. 
 16. Levin, supra note 11. 
 17. Mills, supra note 13. 
 18. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 19. Levin, supra note 11. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Iran Charged over Argentina Bomb, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2006, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 6085768.stm [hereinafter Iran Charged]. 
 22. See Council on Foreign Relations, Hamas: Backgrounder, http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication/8968/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010).  
 23. Hamas Secures More Iranian Funding, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 6, 2007, available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2A62C583-E1C7-454E-B0B3-16DB56E3C4FD.htm. 
 24. See Rory McCarthy, Hamas Rockets Bring Israeli City in Range, THE GUARDIAN, 
Mar. 5, 2008, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/05/israelandthe 
palestinians. 
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Hamas, a group that believes, “In the face of the Jews’ usurpation of Pa-
lestine, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.”25 
While Hamas does not have a history of violence as extensive as Hez-
bollah, Iran’s support for Hamas certainly raised substantial concern.26 
Iran has also provided a bounty to the Gaza-based Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad group for the rockets they fired into Israel.27 
The link between all three of these terrorist organizations is their anti-
Semitism.28 It is no secret that the Iranian regime wants to see the Israeli 
state removed from the Middle East.29 It is the regime’s avowed disdain 
for Israel that also drives global concern over its nuclear program. Al-
though the Iranian regime consistently insists that it is only pursuing nuc-
lear energy for civilian use, it has failed to convince the world of its 
peaceful intentions.30 
B. Nuclear Dispute 
Iran’s civilian nuclear program began with the help of the United 
States in 1959, but the few installations that were in place by 1980 were 
heavily bombed during the Iran-Iraq war.31 Iran’s American-funded civi-
lian nuclear program had been decimated by the time the fighting ended 
in 1988.32 After the war, the Iranian regime secretly began constructing a 
new nuclear program.33 While it was suspected that Iran was trying to 
                                                                                                             
 25. THE COVENANT OF THE ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT art. 15, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hamas.asp. 
 26. See, for example, the comments of former U.S. Treasury Secretary John Snow. 
Press Release, U.S Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Designates Five Charities Funding Hamas 
and Six Senior Hamas Leaders as Terrorist Entities (Aug. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js672.htm. 
 27. Uzi Mahnaimi, Tehran ‘Bounty’ for Attack on Israel, TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 30, 
2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article584462.ece. 
 28. See supra text accompanying notes 22–27. 
 29. There are too many quotes about Israel being a “cancer” to cite. 
 30. See IAEA Report Raises Concerns about Iranian Nuclear Facilities, CNN, 
Nov.16, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/11/16/iran.iaea.nuclear.facility/index.html. 
 31. FRANK BARNABY, WOULD AIR STRIKES WORK? sec. 1.1 (Oxford Research Group, 
Briefing Paper) (2007), http://www. oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/would 
airstrikeswork.pdf. 
 32. See Anti-Defamation League, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in His 
Own Words, Sept. 18, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Anti_Semitism_International/ 
ahmadinejad_words.htm. 
 33. See ALIREZA JAFARZADEH, THE IRAN THREAT: PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD AND THE 
COMING NUCLEAR CRISIS 158 (2007). 
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acquire nuclear weapons as early as the mid-1990s,34 their strides toward 
developing their own devices were kept secret.35 With the aid of nations 
such as Pakistan, China, and Russia, as well as the notorious black-
market nuclear network of A.Q. Khan, Iran developed enough know-
ledge to master the process of uranium enrichment.36 By the turn of the 
millennium, Iran had come a long way in developing a dual-use pro-
gram.37 Iran was mastering the technology necessary for building nuclear 
power generators, but with that ability came the knowledge needed to 
make nuclear weapons.38 
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran—an Iranian politi-
cal opposition group that many accuse of being a terrorist organization—
revealed these nuclear research activities to the world.39 The Internation-
al Atomic Energy Agency (“IAEA”) demanded inspection of the alleged 
nuclear research sites and discovered that Iran had been hiding signifi-
cant amounts of undeclared nuclear materials.40 Since this revelation, 
there has been widespread concern about the Iranian regime’s motiva-
tions.41 
Attempting to assuage the concerns of the global community, the Ira-
nian regime has denied that the program will have any military applica-
tion.42 G. Ali Koshroo, Iran’s former Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal 
and International Affairs, has said that the Iranian regime believes that 
“the acqui[sition], development, and use of nuclear weapons [is] inhu-
man, immoral, illegal and against our basic principles. They have no 
place in Iran’s defense doctrine.”43 Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
                                                                                                             
 34. For example, President Clinton’s Letter to Congress on March 14, 1997, hig-
hlighted that Executive Order 12957 was issued “in response to actions and policies of 
the Government of Iran, including support for international terrorism, efforts to under-
mine the Middle East peace process, and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction 
and the means to deliver them.” Letter from William Clinton, President of the United 
States, to U.S. Congress (Mar. 14, 1997), available at http://www.fas.org/news/iran/ 
1997/wh97031701.htm. 
 35. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158. 
 36. IRAN WATCH, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (2004), http://www.iranwatch.org/wmd/ 
wponac-nuclearhistory-0904.htm. 
 37. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158. 
 38. See id. 
 39. SHARON SQUASSONI, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAN’S NUCLEAR 
PROGRAM: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/nuke/RS21592.pdf. 
 40. Id. at 2. 
 41. This is evidenced by the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, infra Part 
II.C. 
 42. See infra text accompanying note 43. 
 43. BARNABY, supra note 31, at sec. 1.2. 
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Khamenei, has also issued a religious decree saying that the production 
and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam.44 Despite these 
statements, however, doubts persist. These doubts are probably best cap-
tured by Abbas Maleki, former Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, who 
said that Iran’s alleged need for peaceful nuclear power is “akin to rais-
ing cows in your house to provide you with your daily glass of milk.”45 
The United States, Israel, and the U.N. Security Council obviously be-
lieve that the Iranian regime is raising its cows for a more sinister pur-
pose. 
One of the reasons for these doubts is the Iranian regime’s lack of cre-
dibility.46 In 2003, a complex web of lies regarding the conversion activi-
ties of Iranian scientists at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was fi-
nally untangled. Confronted with its conflicting statements, the regime 
was forced to admit that it had lied to the IAEA.47 It has also been re-
vealed that the regime made false statements about their uranium metal 
stocks,48 the P-2 Centrifuge program,49 the extent of the laser enrichment 
program,50 and covert experiments involving reprocessed fuel.51 It is 
quite understandable that, at this point, very little that the regime says 
about its program can be taken at face value. 
To make matters worse, the Iranians have been going to great lengths 
to build hidden, underground facilities that are immune to conventional 
aerial attacks. The facilities at Natanz, for example, are buried beneath 
23 meters of concrete and earth.52 Satellite imagery shows tunneling near 
some existing nuclear sites, leading some to believe that even more se-
cret facilities are being built.53 Further, international inspectors have 
identified nuclear activities on military-controlled sites to which they 
                                                                                                             
 44. Leader’s Fatwa Forbids Nukes, IRAN DAILY, Aug. 11, 2005, http://www. 
irandaily.com/1384/2347/html/index.htm. 
 45. Sepehr Shahshahani, Note, Politics Under the Cover of Law: Can International 
Law Help Resolve the Iran Nuclear Crisis?, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 369, 417 (2007). 
 46. See infra text accompanying note 47. 
 47. See JAFARZADEH, supra note 33, at 158. 
 48. See id. at 158–59. 
 49. See id. at 162. 
 50. See id. at 165–66. 
 51. See id. at 170. 
 52. Whitney Raas & Austin Long, Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to 
Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities, INT’L SECURITY, Spring 2007, at 7, 17 (2007). 
 53. Philip Sherwell, Defiant Iran Insists There’s No Secret as Inspectors Invited to 
Qom Nuclear Site, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK, Sep. 26, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/middleeast/iran/6235547/Defiant-Iran-insists-theres-no-secret-as-inspectors-
invited-to-Qom-nuclear-site.html. 
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have been denied access for inspection.54 Given the amount of circums-
tantial evidence, the global community is finding it hard to believe that 
Iran’s intentions are peaceful. Some in Israel and the U.S. think that the 
Iranian regime is plotting a catastrophe.55 With its contempt for the Israe-
li state, its long-standing support for terrorism, and its undercover nuc-
lear operations, such concerns certainly have an air of validity. Thus, the 
international community must find a way to confront Iran effectively. 
II. THE OPTIONS IN CONTEXT 
A. Diplomacy 
Diplomacy remains a viable tool for persuading the Iranian regime to 
change its behavior. One positive diplomatic option is to entice the re-
gime with an offer of regional power sharing in exchange for full en-
gagement with the international community. A negative diplomatic op-
tion is to continue to try to delegitimize the Iranian regime. As will be 
argued below, neither of these options is particularly attractive. Given the 
history of Iran’s principled belligerence, other options must remain on 
the table. 
President Ahmadinejad has caused a stir by making remarks that have 
been construed as denying the Holocaust.56 Most famously, President 
Ahmadinejad commented in 2005 about Israel being “wiped off the 
map.”57 For these remarks, he has received condemnation from the 
U.N.,58 mock indictments for genocide,59 and a criminal indictment in 
absentia in Germany for Holocaust denial.60 These are not the only con-
                                                                                                             
 54. DELPECH, supra note 2, at 10. 
 55. See generally id. 
 56. See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 32. 
 57. While translations may vary, his remarks were, at least, something to that effect. 
For possible alternative translations, see Ethan Bronner, Just How Far Did They Go, 
Those Words Against Israel?, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 4.4. 
 58. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Iran 
(Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8542.doc.htm. 
 59. JUSTUS REID WEINER, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS, REFERRAL OF IRANIAN 
PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD ON THE CHARGE OF INCITEMENT TO COMMIT GENOCIDE (2006), 
available at http://www.jcpa.org/text/ahmadinejad-incitement.pdf; DAVID MATAS, INST. 
FOR INT’L AFFAIRS OF B’NAI BRITH CANADA, INDICTMENT OF IRANIAN PRESIDENT 
MAHMOUD AHMADINEJAD FOR INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE AGAINST THE JEWISH PEOPLE 1 
(2007), available at http://www.bnaibrith.ca/pdf/institute/IndictmentIranianPresident 
March07.pdf. 
 60. Anthony David Marks, Israeli Lawyer Registers Criminal Indictment Against 
Ahmadinejad in German Court, IHC NEWS, May 14, 2006, available at http://www. 
infoisrael.net/images/articles/140520061.pdf. 
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troversial statements that the President has made,61 nor is this the only 
activity for which the Iranian regime has been the subject of criticism. In 
1994, the Iranian regime funded an attack on the Jewish-Argentine Mu-
tual Association building in Buenos Aires, which led the Argentinean 
authorities to indict various Iranian political figures.62 
The Iranian regime has consistently denied aiding the insurgencies in 
Iraq and Afghanistan despite evidence that they are doing just that.63 The 
regime has shown a desire to be a regional leader when the U.S. and its 
coalition forces withdraw from the area.64 This is consistent with Iranian 
philosophy regarding foreign relations; the traditional Islamic doctrine of 
Dar al-Islam says that lands once subjugated by Muslims should remain 
under Muslim control.65 The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan disrupts 
this concept of the Islamic house.66 Of course, the Iranian regime would 
like to see itself playing a large role in ridding these areas of Western 
influence and bringing them back under Islamic control.67 
The Iranian constitution implicitly enshrines the traditional philosophy 
of Dar al-Islam by advocating the export of Islamic government 
throughout the world.68 In furtherance of this goal, Iran has meddled in 
the affairs of Palestine,69 Lebanon,70 Algeria,71 Sudan,72 Afghanistan,73 
                                                                                                             
 61. See Anti-Defamation League, supra note 32.  
 62. Iran Charged, supra note 21. 
 63. See Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, Iran’s Involvement in Iraq, 
http://www.cfr.org /publication/12521/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2010); Document: Iran 
Caught Red-Handed Shipping Arms to Taliban, ABC NEWS, June 6, 2007, http://blogs. 
abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/06/document_iran_c.html. 
 64. Interview by Fletcher Forum of World Affairs with Vali Nasr, Iran: The New 
Claimant to Regional Power?, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Summer 2007, at 9, 17 (2007) 
[hereinafter Interview with Vali Nasr]. 
 65. BAT YE’OR, ISLAM AND DHIMMITUDE 59 (Miriam Kochan &David Littman trans., 
Associated Univ. Presses, 2002). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Beehner, supra note 63. 
 68. Qanuni Assassi Jumhuri’i Isla’mai Iran [The Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran] pmbl. [1980]; see also International Constitutional Law, Iranian Constitution, 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl/ir00000_.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2010). 
 69. See Ron Synovitz, Middle East: Palestinian Official Accuses Iran of Orchestrat-
ing Gaza Seizure, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY, June 25, 2007, 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/06/e8d6e2ff-adbb-4d20-b9b3-
900f9b02afce.html. 
 70. See Middle East Media Res. Inst., Saudi Columnist in Scathing Criticism of Hiz-
bullah and Syria: They are Trying to Destroy Lebanon Down to the Last Man, June 14, 
2007, http://memri.org/ bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD162007. 
 71. Peter St. John, Commentary No. 65: Insurgency, Legitimacy & Intervention in 
Algeria, COMMENT., Jan. 1996, available at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cmmntr/ 
cm65-eng.asp. 
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Yemen,74 Iraq,75 and Somalia,76 among other nations.77 The Iranian re-
gime has tried desperately to elevate itself to the level of a regional pow-
er by spending money to create and then solve problems in countries 
based in traditional Muslim lands.78 The offer of a power-sharing struc-
ture in the region could perhaps prove an effective incentive for Iran to 
conform its behavior. 
B. Economic Sanctions 
The negative economic incentive is, of course, economic sanctions.79 
Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the U.N., has called eco-
nomic sanctions “a necessary middle ground between war and words.”80 
At the same time, there is no shortage of detractors who feel that sanc-
tions do not work.81 Meanwhile, sanctions can produce tremendously 
negative humanitarian consequences not only for the citizens of the tar-
geted state, but also for citizens of neighboring states. Even the state im-
                                                                                                             
 72. Iran Accused of Promoting Shiitism in Sudan, SUDAN TRIB., Dec. 24, 2006, 
http://www.sudantribune. com/spip.php?article19431. 
 73. See Muhammad Tahir, Iranian Involvement in Afghanistan, TERRORISM MONITOR, 
Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/archivesgta/ 
gta2007/ (follow “Volume 5 Issue 1” hyperlink, then follow “Iranian Involvement in 
Afghanistan” hyperlink). 
 74. Reuters, Yemen Accuses Iran of Backing Shi’ite Rebels, IRAN FOCUS, May 24, 
2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/news desk/L24560705.htm. 
 75. Iran Spent over $1 Billion on Meddling in Iraq: Defence Minister, IRAN FOCUS 
Jan. 17, 2005, http://www.iranfocus.com/en/iraq/iran-spent-over-1-billion-on-meddling-
in-iraq-defence-minister-01258.html. 
 76. The Chairman of the Monitoring Group on Somalia, Report of the Monitoring 
Group on Somalia, ¶¶ 87–94, delivered to the Chairman of the Security Council Commit-
tee, U.N. Doc. S/2006/913 (Oct. 16, 2006). 
 77. Yaakov Katz, 10 Israelis ‘Recruited as Spies By Iran, THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 
17, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2Fshow 
Full&cid=117615281494. 
 78. See Mark Tran, Ahmadinejad: Iran ready to fill Iraq power vacuum” Guardian 
Unlimited, The GUARDIAN, Aug. 28, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/ 
aug/28/usa.iraq. 
 79. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Israel Lobbies Beijing for Iran Sanctions, WALL ST. J. 
(ONLINE), Feb. 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703940 
704575089731976340748.html. 
 80. Chantal de Jonge Ondraat, Economic Sanctions and International Peace and 
Security, in LEASHING THE DOGS OF WAR 335, 335 (Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hamp-
son & Pamela Aall eds., 2007). 
 81. See generally Robert A. Page, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, INT’L 
SECURITY, Fall 1997, at 90, 90 (1997); Robert A. Page, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do 
Not Work, 23 INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1998, at 66, 66 (1998). 
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posing sanctions can be negatively affected.82 At the very least, econom-
ic sanctions require careful implementation in order to avoid serious un-
intended effects. 
Now consider the positive economic incentive: aid. This can take many 
forms, such as direct funding from national governments or the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.83 Economic Aid can also be geared toward enabl-
ing a state to engage in self-help in the future—one example would be 
aiding Iran’s push to become a member of the World Trade Organiza-
tion.84 By holding this carrot out for the regime, the world may be able to 
influence its behavior without imposing the negative consequences of 
sanctions. 
Once upon a time, the U.S. had very cordial relations with Iran. These 
soured with the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis at the 
American Embassy in Tehran. In response to this turn of events,85 the 
U.S. created the Iranian Assets Control Regulations.86 These regulations 
instituted an asset freeze on the assets of the Iranian government in the 
U.S. and were subsequently expanded to include a full trade embargo.87 
Upon the signing of the Algiers Accords in 1981, the trade embargo was 
lifted and most of the frozen assets were released.88 While these regula-
tions still partially remain in place,89 they are of little practical effect for 
the relations between the two countries today. 
In 1987, a second set of sanctions came into force. President Ronald 
Reagan issued an executive order prohibiting all imports of goods and 
services from Iran into the U.S.90 He did so “[t]o ensure that United 
States imports of Iranian goods and services will not contribute financial 
support to terrorism or to further aggressive actions against non-
belligerent shipping.”91 Eventually, the Reagan Executive Order gave 
                                                                                                             
 82. See De Jonge Ondraat, supra note 80 at 335. 
 83. Mike Bagully, The Iranian Dilemma, 11 GEO. PUBLIC POL’Y REV. 111, 116 
(2005). 
 84. Id. 
 85. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHAT YOU 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF O.F.A.C 
REGULATIONS INVOLVING SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN 4 (2009), http://www.treas.gov/ 
offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/iran/iran.pdf [hereinafter U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: 
IRAN]. 
 86. 31 C.F.R. § 535 (2009). 
 87. U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IRAN, supra note 85, at 4. 
 88. Id. at 4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Exec. Order No. 12613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41940 (Oct. 30, 1987). 
 91. Id. 
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rise to the Iranian Transactions Regulations,92 which codified the U.S. 
embargo on trade in goods and services and are still in effect today.93 
The Iranian Transactions Regulations, however, go further than the Rea-
gan Executive Order as they prohibit not only the importation of Iranian 
goods and services, but also the exportation and re-exportation of U.S. 
goods, technology, and services to Iran.94 
In 1995, President Clinton’s Executive Orders 1295795 and 1295996 
tightened the sanctions against Iran even further. This time, however, the 
sanctions did not focus on flows of goods, services, and technology. Ra-
ther, these two executive orders prohibited flows of money from the U.S. 
to Iran.97 In particular, they prohibited: new investments in Iranian prop-
erty,98 the financing of imports of goods and services, the financing of 
exports of goods, services, and technology,99 and the financing, supervis-
ing, and managing of the development of petroleum resources located in 
Iran.100 All of these provisions were also later included in the Iranian 
Transactions Regulations.101 Violations of the Iranian Transactions Regu-
lations could be criminally punished with up to $1 million in fines and, 
for natural persons, up to 20 years in jail.102 
Suspecting that the restrictions on its own citizens were not enough, 
the U.S. enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (“ILSA”) a year later 
in 1996.103 According to one American author, the act was “born out of 
frustration that our allies and friends were unwilling to restrict invest-
ment into Iran’s petroleum sector as did the U.S. in 1995.”104 The pur-
pose of the ILSA was, in effect, to bar access to American markets—
essentially, to create a secondary boycott—of non-U.S. companies that 
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invest in Iranian petroleum development.105 While the ILSA sanctions 
have yet to be imposed on a foreign company,106 the threat has induced 
non-U.S. firms to join their American counterparts and avoid invest-
ments in Iran. 
The economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States are 
heavy. They include embargoes on goods, services, technology, and in-
vestment flows.107 On the other hand, the sanctions are unilateral.108 Al-
though the U.S. has used the ILSA to try to influence companies in other 
nations to comply with the sanctions, they have no jurisdiction aside 
from denying access to American markets. The price of U.S. sanctions 
may be steep for Iran, but in the end, the application of the sanctions is 
quite narrow. 
By 2006, the U.N. Security Council had seen several IAEA reports ex-
pressing concern over Iran’s nuclear program and the Iranian regime’s 
lack of cooperation in providing information about it. In its Resolution 
1696,109 the Security Council issued an ultimatum to the Iranian regime: 
either cease nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, and comply 
with the IAEA’s transparency procedures or become the target of U.N. 
sanctions.110 The resolution gave the Iranian regime one month to comp-
ly before sanctions would take effect.111 Needless to say, Iran refused. 
On December 23, 2006, nearly four months after the deadline for com-
pliance, the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1737,112 marking 
the first round of sanctions. Among other things, this resolution prohi-
bited the supply, sale, or transfer of goods which could aid Iran’s nuclear 
program;113 prohibited the financing of the acquisition of such goods;114 
limited Iran’s ability to export goods related to its nuclear activities or 
ballistic missiles;115 restricted the mobility of those named persons in-
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volved with Iran’s nuclear program;116 and also froze the assets of these 
persons and entities.117 These sanctions were subject to review after a 
period of 60 days.118 In the event that Iran did not comply with the Secu-
rity Council’s demands, the U.N. reserved the right to toughen the sanc-
tions in a further resolution.119 
When the Iranian regime failed to comply, the Security Council indeed 
toughened the sanctions. In Resolution 1747,120 the Security Council 
broadened the list of named persons and entities that were subject to the 
mobility121 and asset-freezing122 sanctions. In addition, the Security 
Council restricted Iran’s ability to sell and transfer arms,123 and called on 
U.N. member nations to restrict grants, financial assistance, and conces-
sional loans to the Government of Iran except for humanitarian or devel-
opment purposes.124 These sanctions were also subject to review after 60 
days.125 Again, Iran failed to comply. 
The the third set of sanctions arrived with Resolution 1803.126 Once 
more, the Security Council expanded the list of persons and entities sub-
ject to the mobility127 and asset-freezing128 provisions. Furthermore, the 
Security Council called on “all states to exercise vigilance in entering 
into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade 
with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insur-
ance, to their nationals and entities,”129 and to “exercise vigilance over 
the activities in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran . . . .”130 
This round of sanctions, however, was given an expanded 90-day period 
before review.131 
To date, Iran has yet to comply with the Security Council’s demands. 
At the time of this writing, a fourth round of sanctions is being contem-
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. ¶ 10.Exceptions are made for nationals of other countries and humanitarian 
considerations. See id. at ¶ 11. 
 117. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 112, at ¶ 12. Exceptions are made for basic necessi-
ties, among other things. Id. at ¶¶ 13–15. 
 118. S.C. Res. 1737, supra note 112, at ¶24. 
 119. Id. at ¶24(c). 
 120. See S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007). 
 121. Id. at ¶ 2. 
 122. Id. at ¶ 4. 
 123. Id. at ¶ 5. 
 124. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 125. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 126. See S.C. Res. 1803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008). 
 127. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 128. Id. at ¶7. 
 129. Id. at ¶ 9. 
 130. Id. at ¶ 3. 
 131. Id. at ¶ 3. 
408 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 35:2 
plated which would target the assets of the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards.132 While the Security Council does not appear to be supportive 
of a strong fourth round of sanctions,133 other international organiza-
tions—particularly the G8 group of nations—appear poised to push for 
sanctions.134 Sanctions on the assets of the Revolutionary Guards will not 
be as strong as those that were previously contemplated against the Ira-
nian oil sector135 (an embargo on refined petroleum products would be 
particularly painful for Iran, as 40% of the country’s domestic oil con-
sumption is refined outside of the country);136 still, they are a step in the 
right direction. 
In contrast to sanctions imposed by the United States, those imposed 
by the U.N. Security Council have very broad application. In theory, the 
prescribed measures are adhered to by all of the U.N. member-states. 
Meanwhile, the impact of U.S. sanctions is limited—the number of states 
joining the U.S. is limited even though the U.S. is broader in scope.137 If 
sanctions as serious as an embargo on petroleum exportation to Iran are 
to have an immediate effect, they must be adopted by the Security Coun-
cil rather than unilaterally by the U.S.138 
C. The Military Option 
Many have urged the exercise of military options before Iran develops 
a nuclear weapon. A similar nuclear threat in 1981 resulted in the Israeli 
Air Force flying into Iraq and bombing the Osiraq nuclear reactor.139 The 
attack was quite successful in that it slowed down the Iraqi nuclear wea-
pons program to the point where Iraq was no longer a nuclear threat to 
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Israel’s existence.140 Could a similar preemptive attack be launched 
against Iran? If yes, should it be launched? There are many difficulties in 
planning a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. First, there is the sheer 
number of potential targets. In 2007, it was estimated that a strike inside 
Iran would present some 400 potential targets in order to have a relative-
ly high certainty of success.141 Without hitting all of these targets, the 
Iranian nuclear program would be able to continue unfettered in some 
capacity until the destroyed facilities come back online.142 
Among the 400 potential targets, roughly 75 would require some sort 
of penetrating warhead.143 After witnessing Iraq’s experience with its 
Osiraq reactor, Iran took pains to hide its facilities both in underground 
installations and near heavily populated areas.144 The facility at Natanz, 
for example, is covered by nearly 23 meters of concrete and earth.145 Ad-
ditionally, there is no guarantee that all of the 400 targets are still func-
tioning facilities. Any type of bombing exercise would likely destroy 
facilities that are no longer affiliated with the nuclear program. In a heav-
ily populated area, this is a serious concern. Further, even if all the facili-
ties could be destroyed with minimal civilian casualties, the program 
might continue nonetheless. As Mohamed El Baradei, the head of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, is fond of saying: “you cannot 
bomb knowledge.”146 Facilities can easily be rebuilt. Equipment can be 
repurchased and smuggled into the country through a variety of means 
regardless of the ongoing sanctions. It is the knowledge of the nuclear 
fuel cycle—knowledge that can survive any amount of bombing—that 
will keep the Iranian nuclear program alive. At this point, it seems as if it 
will only be a matter of time before Iran obtains the technological know-
ledge required to build a nuclear weapon.147 
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There is another option—a military strike after the Iranian regime has 
obtained the materials and knowledge required to build a nuclear bomb. 
This, of course, would have to take a much different form. During the 
Second World War, the British employed tripwires for the Germans and 
Italians when they finally decided that appeasement was no longer possi-
ble. On March 31, 1939, the British announced that any aggression 
against Polish independence would bring a military response from both 
the United Kingdom and France.148 This was followed by both govern-
ments issuing similar guarantees for the independence of Greece and 
Romania in April of 1939.149 Hitler was infuriated watching the British 
engage in what he called “the policy of encirclement.”150 Despite the 
guarantees, of course, Hitler went ahead with his plans to invade Poland 
on September 1, 1939, and started World War II. 
In speaking about the British guarantees against Hitler’s aggressive 
plan, Lord Halifax said, “[I]t might still be possible to deter him from its 
execution if, as we had failed to do in 1914, we made it unmistakably 
clear that the particular acts of aggression which he was believed to have 
in mind would result in a general war.”151 Obviously, Hitler was not de-
terred. On the other hand, his aggression was finally unmasked and even-
tually his reign of terror was brought to an end. The tripwires may have 
encouraged the eruption of violence, but, in the end, they solved the un-
derlying problem. 
Tripwires may also be effective for the Iranian situation. Clearly, how-
ever, the hope is that they would prevent a war rather than start one. By 
having guidelines with a clear set of serious consequences, rational lead-
ers would seek to confine their activities to avoid the tripwires.152 If the 
leaders of Iran choose to follow in the footsteps of Hitler and flagrantly 
violate the tripwire provisions, perhaps war is the only way to prevent 
them from committing atrocities against Israel. If the Iranian regime 
turns out to be as aggressive as Hitler was, it is probably in the world’s 
best interest to address the problem early on. 
The positive side of military intervention is military aid, though it is 
not necessarily worth considering in this situation. Military aid serves its 
greatest purpose when the intervening party and the target regime share a 
mutual interest in resolving an ongoing dispute between the target regime 
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and a third party.153 The Iranian regime’s only dispute in this case is with 
Israel.154 Providing the Iranian regime with weapons in exchange for 
dropping their aggressive stance toward the Israelis is simply illogical. If 
military intervention is to take place, it can only be in the negative form 
in this situation.  
II. SUGGESTIONS 
A. Diplomacy 
What was left of the Iranian regime’s credibility has vanished after the 
controversial 2009 Iranian Presidential election. The recent election fias-
co155 appears to have eroded a large portion of the regime’s power 
base.156 The Iranian youth has become very disenchanted with Iran’s po-
litical system.157 The recurrent demonstrations and clashes between the 
opposition and the regime’s security forces throughout Iran are growing 
increasingly violent.158 Losing legitimacy and facing shrinking domestic 
support, the regime has been relegated to violence to suppress the oppo-
sition. It is said that domestic politics determine foreign policy.159 Iran’s 
domestic “insurrection” should give pause to the U.S. as a lead negotia-
tor. The U.S. simply does not know whether the regime will still be in 
power or be replaced. The regime itself is constrained in negotiations 
because of the domestic situation. Also, if the regime has its hands full 
dealing with the domestic situation, it is unlikely to launch aggression 
against anyone. 
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On the other hand, the regime has a habit of blaming others for its own 
problems. The protesters’ deaths following the election demonstrations 
were blamed on Britain and other Western countries.160 It is not outside 
the realm of possibility that the regime would use Israel as a distraction 
or scapegoat for its own internal problems. That being said, the regime 
seems to be aware of the potential ramifications of a preemptive at-
tack.161 It would be sheer insanity to attempt any sort of violence without 
solidified domestic unity. Domestic turmoil and shattered credibility 
have left the regime politically weak and vulnerable. This situation con-
tinues to provide uncertainty with respect to plans for diplomatic en-
gagement. 
From the positive standpoint, regional power sharing also does not 
make much sense at the present. Given the domestic troubles currently 
facing the regime, Iran is in no position to assuage the civil unrest in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. If the regime is offered diplomatic engagement, there is 
no telling what lengths it may go to in order to quell the rebellious voices 
in the country. Further, the democratic governments of the West will not 
want to be seen holding hands with an unstable regime, particularly an 
authoritarian one.162 Given the current political environment in Iran, it is 
best to refrain from any sort of diplomatic measures altogether. 
B. It’s the Economy, Afterall 
The environment is optimal, however, for further economic meas-
ures—both positive and negative. With the current political unrest, the 
Iranian regime may be desperate to complete its nuclear quest and rees-
tablish its legitimacy. If this is the case, it will sink as much money as is 
feasible into the program to finish it as quickly as possible. If sanctions 
are stepped up now, they will reduce the amount of money available for 
the nuclear program. If the government makes cuts to social programs, 
hospitals, and schools in order to redirect money toward nuclear science, 
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the political unrest in the country will likely boil over. Stepping up sanc-
tions now has the prospect of suffocating Iran’s nuclear program. 
The population in Iran is young and growing increasingly desperate.163 
If sanctions are upgraded and the regime does nothing to offset them, the 
ensuing unemployment and inflation will further antagonize the popula-
tion. There will be a breaking point when the Iranian population will 
refuse to endure the country’s persisting economic problems. Such a 
breaking point was reached in 1979 when the Iranian people could no 
longer put up with the Shah’s economic mismanagement.164 The Iranians 
are a proud people, and, if the situation gets much worse, they will rise to 
the occasion. A strengthening of the sanctions in place could, at least 
theoretically, give them the final push that they need to overthrow the 
regime and install the democracy that the people have wanted for so 
long.165 Sanctions and selective military force proved effective in Libya 
because of the country’s domestic pressure at the time.166 
Positive economic measures might also have a drastic impact in the 
current environment. The regime is facing a great deal of adversity and is 
searching for some form of accomplishment to latch onto in order to re-
capture some of its legitimacy.167 If the global powers were to offer the 
regime increased trade or a place in the World Trade Organization, for 
example, in exchange for an end to their nuclear activities, the regime is 
unlikely to forgo an opportunity to increase its legitimacy and improve 
its economic plight. Of course, we must also keep in mind that the re-
gime has been duplicitous in similar situations.168 If such an agreement 
were to be reached, there would have to be some serious—possibly mili-
tary—consequences should the regime renege on the agreement and take 
the carrot while continuing its nuclear activities. In the event such an 
agreement does occur, the Iranian regime should be tied down with trip-
wires to the greatest extent possible. 
C. The Military Option 
In the current environment, if an assault is to take place on Iran before 
it builds a nuclear weapon, the assault must either be in response to an 
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attack by Iran or be in accordance with a Security Council agreement.169 
A Security Council agreement is highly unlikely, given the stances of 
Russia and China on the issue.170 If Israel, or the U.S., finds a pretext that 
is short of full blown aggression by Iran, international support would not 
be behind such a retributive attack.171 Thus, a preemptive attack on Iran 
is not, at this moment, militarily, politically, or legally feasible. Putting 
tripwires in place, however, remains an attractive option.172 But, with 
regard to the Iranian situation, what should the tripwires be? In keeping 
with the historical precedent, an attack or attempted attack on another 
country using nuclear material should be the first red line. Traditional 
attacks on other countries by Iran can be dealt with in the traditional fa-
shion—treating the act as a causus belli and engaging in war. Relations 
between states have worked under this rule for countless years and there 
is no reason to change now.173 
Iran usually does not engage in conventional warfare. They use prox-
ies, such as Hezbollah or Hamas, to carry out aggression for them. The 
individual target countries of such attacks have done enough to deter 
them so far and have allies they can call on should the attacks get any 
worse. If Iran were to cross the threshold and ship nuclear material to 
these groups174—whether the materials are used or not—a tripwire 
should be activated and the international community should step in. 
While a dirty bomb may not be as destructive as a conventional terrorist 
attack, the psychological and economic effects on the target country 
would be devastating.175 Not only that, but dirty bomb attacks are unner-
                                                                                                             
 169. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War Be-
tween States, 38 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 41, 41 (2007). 
 170. Russia and China are generally opposed to sanctions. See Helene Cooper & Wil-
liam J. Broad, Russia and China Endorse Agency’s Rebuke of Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/28nuke.html. 
 171. For example, Israel may argue that Iran’s ongoing support of terror attacks 
against Israel constitutes a causus belli, and the U.S. could point to Iran’s naval activities 
in the Strait of Hormuz. See Barbara Starr, Iranian Boats ‘Harass’ U.S. Navy, Officials 
Say, CNN, Jan. 7 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/01/07/ 
iran.us.navy/index.html. 
 172. Similar suggestions have been made by other scholars. See Interview by Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs with Martin Indyk, This New Struggle for Power: Assessing 
American Foreign Policy in the Middle East, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter 2007, at 
51, 57. 
 173. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Pre-
Emptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 67, 67 (2005). 
 174. For a discussion of Iran arming terrorists with “dirty bombs,” see Greenblum, 
supra note 154, at 81. 
 175. Chairman of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes, Report of 
the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our 
2010] OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING IRAN 415 
vingly simple to carry out.176 Therefore, the possession or use of dirty 
bombs should not be tolerated. The nuclear material is likely to be fin-
gerprinted and traced back to Iran.177 If such material is used or is found 
in the possession of one of Iran’s proxies, the international community 
should step in to forcibly change the regime. 
Evidence that Iran is enriching uranium beyond the needs of a civilian 
electricity generation program should be a second tripwire. To be used in 
a civilian electricity generation program, uranium need only be enriched 
to a level of 2% to 6%.178 To be used in a nuclear weapon, uranium is 
enriched to over 90%.179 This discrepancy leaves plenty of room for a 
line to be drawn as to an acceptable level of enrichment. If it were dis-
covered that the Iranians were enriching uranium past a certain point—
say, 20%, for example—that could be deemed a clear sign that there are 
military intentions for the program. Once such evidence is established, 
the international community should step in and put an end to Iran’s ura-
nium enrichment. Unfortunately, given the regime’s secrecy regarding its 
program, such evidence will likely be difficult to discover.180  
As a final tripwire, Iran should not be allowed to manufacture, devel-
op, purchase, or possess any nuclear-capable warheads. Accumulation of 
such weapons shows a lack of good faith on behalf of the Iranian regime. 
Even if the regime’s enrichment remains at the civilian level, the accu-
mulation of warheads is a clear sign of a military intent. With the civilian 
technology already in place, it would only be a matter of months before 
weapons-grade uranium could be manufactured. If the warhead delivery 
mechanism is kept out of the Iranian regime’s hands, the civilian pro-
gram presents less of a threat. 
The point of the tripwires is to strike a compromise between the two 
positions. The Iranians say they only want peaceful electricity genera-
tion, but the U.N. Security Council is concerned that they want nuclear 
weapons.181 The aim of the tripwires is to allow for a peaceful legitimate 
civilian energy program while providing guarantees that the military po-
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tential of the program will not be realized. If the Iranian regime restricts 
its activities to accord with its claimed intentions, the conflict will dissi-
pate and a war, which seems almost inevitable to some,182 will surely be 
avoided. 
Ideally, these tripwires would be put in place by the U.N. Security 
Council as a supplement to economic measures. If the Iranian regime 
violates the terms of the tripwires, all of the nations within the interna-
tional community will be free to respond in accordance with the pre-
viously agreed-upon consequences. There is the possibility, however, 
that either Russia or China will prevent such tripwires from being 
enacted.183 Political squabbling could remove the U.N. Security Coun-
cil’s role as an option, but the U.N. should not be the only means of 
putting the tripwires in place. As an alternative, these tripwires could be 
enacted unilaterally by the United States and Israel. The message to the 
Iranian regime may not be as forceful as it would be if coming from the 
Security Council, but the measures could still be successful nonetheless. 
The key will be the enacting nation’s or organization’s ability to follow 
through with the outlined consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, there are three ways to approach the current problem with the 
Iranian regime: diplomatically, economically, or militarily. To date, the 
international community has taken diplomatic and economic positions 
and has only threatened military action. Given the current political envi-
ronment in Iran, it is time to step up the economic approach and put mili-
tary tripwire measures in place in the event that the economic steps prove 
ineffective. It is also time to consider providing the regime with some 
economic carrots to coax them out of their aggressive stance. Such incen-
tives could provide the regime with a path that allows them to save face 
while acceding to global demands to halt their nuclear program. If some-
thing as mutually beneficial as increased trade can be given to the regime 
in exchange for more acceptable behavior, the option should certainly be 
canvassed. 
On the other hand, there is always the threat that the regime will back-
track. Furthermore, other regimes may see this compromise as a green 
light to act like rogue states for a few years and hold global security hos-
tage in exchange for economic benefits. To address both situations, any 
benefits package should be accompanied by as many restrictions and 
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tripwires as possible. The regime needs to know that it cannot renege on 
its commitments, and other regimes need to see that the regime has not 
been completely enriched by its deviance from international norms. 
As a broader point, this situation should act as a testing ground for me-
thods of dealing with state funders of terrorism in the post-9/11 world. 
Whatever approach is taken by the United Nations, the United States, 
and the global community at large, it should be analyzed for its possible 
effectiveness in other situations. Of course, no two threats are the same. 
Nor is it viable to devise a “one-size-fits-all” approach in an international 
arena that is so diverse. General principles, however, should be transfer-
able among such situations. The foreign policy toolbox contains numer-
ous tools that should be deployed judiciously, each at the right time in 
light of the specific context. However, one thing is certain: Iran is not the 
only country that acts aggressively on the global playground. Also, Israel 
is not the only victim. The rest of the kids on the playground must band 
together to find a solution that will keep the aggressors at bay in the in-
terest of peace, order, and mutual wellbeing. 
